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ABSTRACT 
Biometrics-based personal authentication systems that use physiological (e.g., fingerprint, face) or 
behavioral (e.g., speech, handwriting) traits are becoming increasingly popular, compared to traditional 
systems that are based on tokens (e.g., key) or knowledge (e.g., password). On the other hand, biometric 
systems are vulnerable to attacks, which can decrease their security. This paper analyzes and surveys the 
vulnerabilities and security threats of the finger print biometric systems used for access control and the 
authentication of access to confidential information in network system environment. As analysis tools, 
two biometric network models are implemented and connected to see some of the arguments of the 
vulnerabilities and security threats. Based on that, analysis and surveying, experimental solutions and 
countermeasures are presented.  
Keyword: Biometric, security threats, telebiometric, finger print. 
1. Introduction  
The term biometric is derived from the Greek words bio (life) and metrics (to measure). 
Biometrics is automated methods of recognizing a person based on a physiological or behavioral 
characteristic. Among the features measured are faced, fingerprints, hand geometry, handwriting, 
iris, retinal, vein, and voice. Biometric technologies are becoming the foundation of an extensive 
array of highly secure identification and personal verification solutions. As the level of security 
breaches and transaction fraud increases, the need for highly secure identification and personal 
verification technologies is becoming apparent. This paper addresses and analyzes the security 
threats of finger print biometrics authentication system in a network system environment. After 
the introduction given in section 1, section 2, literature view of the nine biometrics network 
models-based personal authentication technology and their security threats is presented. In 
section 3, the analysis of the nine biometric network models and their security threats is 
presented. Based on that, analysis and surveying, surveyed experimental solutions and surveyed 
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countermeasures are presented. But for threat 4, laboratory experiment is accomplished by the 
authors using packet tracer software called Wire Shark, to capture the data travelled into the 
network, proving the security vulnerability threat this component. Finally, conclusion will be 
discussed in section 4.  
2. Literature Survey  
Based on the ITU RFC, question 8/17 regarding telebiomtric system mechanism study, 
Yongnyou and Woochang divided biometric models into nine categories (all combinations of the 
three items in the two table below) (Yongnyou and Woochang, 2009)  
 
Fig.1. Nine biometric network models 
A Telebiometric System Mechanism (TSM) defines the telebiometric authentication models 
considering the locations in which biometric reference templates are stored and the manner in 
which they are compared, as shown in Fig.1 (Yongnyou and Woochang, 2009). 
Of the nine models, some utilize a Trusted Third Party (TTP) for authenticating a user’s 
public key, registered biometric reference information, and the security evaluation result based 
on the common criteria scheme for biometric devices. A TTP can also perform biometric 
comparison (Yongnyou and Woochang, 2009). 
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Fig.2 illustrates the biometric component through a network. A component sends biometric 
data to the component of the next step for processing. The telebiometric functional model refers 
to the model of the function to be included in transmission in a biometric system. A biometric 
function obtains the output of the previous stage for input; each function is performed 
independently. The authentication context for biometrics based on a biometric verification 
process consists of five sub-processes, which are data capture, signal processing, storage, 
comparison and decision (Yongnyou and Woochang, 2009).  
 
Fig.2. Security threats of biometric network model (Yongnyou and Woochang, 2009) 
Fig.2 illustrates the threats associated with the biometric component through a network in the 
biometric verification process model. In this model, each component sends processed biometric 
data to the next component. Compared to a general biometric functional model, in a 
telebiometric functional model, processed biometric data is transmitted between components 
through telecommunications media, denoted as NW in Fig.2 (Yongnyou and Woochang, 2009). 
Fig.2 illustrates that not only each component in the model but also the transmissions 
between components are vulnerable to external attacks. An external attack can be an external 
invasion when biometric data is delivered to the next step, and may include the modification of 
processed biometric data. By type, the threats can be defined as follows:  
 T1: Threat to biometric input devices  
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 T2: Threat to the process of transmitting biometric raw data to the signal-processing 
component  
 T3: Threat to the signal-processing component  
 T4: Threat to the process of transmitting the extracted biometric templates to the 
comparison component  
 T5: Threat to the comparison component  
 T6: Threat to biometric storage component  
 T7: Threat to the process of transferring biometric templates from the registration 
component to the storage component  
 T8: Threat to the process of transmitting the matching score from the comparison 
component  
 T9: Threat to the registration component  
 T10: Threat to the decision component  
 T11: Threat to the process of transmitting the stored biometric template to the 
comparison component  
 T12: Threat to the process of transmitting the decision result to an application system  
Biometric raw data can be altered or intercepted by an attacker and used for illegal purposes 
when being sent to the signal-processing component. The definition of this type of threat was a 
T2 threat, and provides a guideline for protection (Yongnyou and Woochang, 2009).  
Biometric raw data acquired from a capture device can be attacked and disclosed by illegal 
users before it is safely transmitted to the signal-processing component. The definition for this 
type of threat was a T7 threat (Yongnyou and Woochang, 2009).  
Table 1 expresses the vulnerabilities of the nine models using the threats defined earlier 
“Threats to telebiometric systems”.  
 
Table 1: Vulnerabilities of the nine TSM models (Yongnyou and Woochang, 2009) 
 
This table assumes that, in general, the models have the data capture component and the 
signal processing component in the same location. However, for the models that use outsourced 
comparison, the signal-processing component is located at the same location as the comparison 
component resides. 
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It is also assumed that the comparison and the decision components are combined in the 
same module. Furthermore, TTP guarantees the safety and security of biometric template data 
that is both stored and transmitted. 
When developing a biometrics-based networked manufacturing system, the telebiometric 
system model of the developed system should be checked, and potential threats should be 
analyzed according to Table 1, with appropriate security measures taken. (Yongnyou and 
Woochang, 2009).  
3. Security Threats of Finger Print Biometric in Network System Environment  
In this section, analysis of the twelve security threats of biometric network models will be 
discussed in details. Also for each threat, surveyed experimental solutions will be introduced to 
overcome these security threats. The experimental solutions provided by the authors for threat 4 
and threat 6 will be implemented using:  
a. Two different commercial finger print biometric devices and HP Pavilion tx2000 laptop 
to design the biometric network models. The local and download models will be 
implemented and connected of the nine biometric models due to the fact that is widely 
used other than the biometric network models.  
b. The well known Wire Shark version 1.2.9 sniffer and data capturing to capture the data 
travelled through the implemented biometric networks.  
c. Commercial finger print data base software to show the format of the saved template.  
 
3.1 Threat 1 (T1): Threat to biometric input devices  
According to table 1, this threat is shared by all biometric network models. The analysis and 
countermeasures of this threat will be discussed below. 
3.1.1 Analysis  
Threat 1 is the threat to the biometric input device (at the data capturing stage). This means, 
presenting legitimate users template by an attacker to fool the data capturing component. To 
analyze this threat, a finger print device will be used as an example of biometric devices.  
As an example, lifting a latent fingerprint from finger print device, the attacker must know 
the legitimate users whereabouts and the surfaces she/he has touched. Next, the attacker must lift 
a latent fingerprint of good quality. 
This is not easy in practice because most latent fingerprints are left are incomplete, wrapped 
around irregular surfaces, or partially canceled by fingers slipping. Then, the attacker has to 
make an accurate three-dimensional model of the finger as shown in Fig.3. This requires both 
expertise and laboratory equipment such as a high-resolution scanner, a three dimensional 
printing device (such as a stereo-lithography printer), and so on.  
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Fig.3. Fake fingers made by: a) Rubber Scan b) Wafer thin plastic (Matsumoto et al., 2002) 
Recently, Tsutomu Matsumoto et al. (2002) documented several detailed methods of creating 
a fake finger from silicone and gelatine to fool many commercially available fingerprint data 
capturing. Although producing a gummy clone of an available real finger (from a consenting 
user) is relatively simple, reconstructing a fake finger from a latent fingerprint remains quite 
complicated. Also, Dead fingers can be counted as fake fingers that can fool the biometric 
systems.  
3.1.2 Countermeasures  
The attacker cannot be prevented from collecting biometric data outside the system, but can 
only do is to detect or deter fake biometric attack. To overcome such threat multiple of surveyed 
experimental solutions can be considered:  
a. Derakhshani et al. (2003) proposed two software-based methods (not based on sensors 
that measure temperature, conductivity, etc.) for fingerprint liveness detection. They used 
a commercially available capacitive sensor and the sole input to the liveness detection 
module is a 5-second video of the fingerprints. In their static method, the periodicity of 
sweat pores along the ridges is used for liveness detection. In the dynamic method, sweat 
diffusion pattern over time along the ridges is measured. Live fingers, fingers from 
cadavers, and dummy fingers made up of play dough are used in the experiments. 
b. Heart pulses to be integrated with the input sensor (data capturing) and sensor that 
measure temperatures.  
3.2 Threat 2 (T2): Threat to the process of transmitting biometric raw data to the signal-
processing component  
According to table 1, all biometric network models have no such threat except comparison 
outsourcing by server model. The analysis and countermeasures of this threat will be discussed 
below.  
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3.2.1 Analysis  
In this mode of attack, a recorded signal is replayed to the system and resubmitting 
previously stored digitized biometrics signals bypassing it the data capturing. Examples include 
the presentation of an old copy of a fingerprint image or the presentation of a previously 
recorded audio signal. Noting that the finger print image presented by the attacker should be a 
full image before the feature extracted applied.  
3.2.2 Countermeasures  
To overcome such threat, several countermeasures can be taken:  
a. A detection function, such as an encoding technique, can be applied to check the validity 
of transferred biometric data.  
b. Challenge-response protocol shall be established between the capture device and the 
signal-processing component in order to detect a replay attack. A replay attack in 
biometrics is the resubmission of illegally intercepted data in order to fool the biometric 
system. An example of protecting biometric systems from a replay attack is the adoption 
of a challenge-response protocol in transmission, in which messages hold a freshness 
property by inserting a nonce, a timestamp or sequential numbers into the messages. 
3.3 Threat 3 (T3): Threat to the signal-processing component  
According to table 1, this threat is shared only by (local, download, attached, center, 
references management on TTP for local and references management on TTP for center). The 
analysis and countermeasures of this threat will be discussed below. 
3.3.1 Analysis  
It is also called a feature extractor. In this threat, the attacker could override the feature 
extraction process. The feature extractor is attacked using a Trojan horse, so that it produces 
feature sets preselected by the attacker. 
3.3.2 Countermeasures  
To reduce this threat, three facts have to be understood here:  
a. If the attacker will change the extracted feature values, she/he should know in advance 
how vendor algorithm works.  
b. Remapping the extracted feature is very complicated in finger print devices due to the 
fact that the information is not tied to specific geometrical relationships.  
c. Algorithm vendors keep their algorithms to be secret code.  
Also a practical solution is: the use of the buffer overflow. Any part of a trusted system that 
takes in information is generally buffering its received data. While the designer makes certain 
Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Technology Research 1 (2011) 36-51 
 
 
           
43 
 
assumptions about the operation of a device, it may be possible to introduce data that would 
overflow the buffer. When the buffer overflow, the device is compromised and cannot be trusted.  
3.4 Threat 4 (T4): Threat to the process of transmitting the extracted biometric templates to the 
comparison component  
According to table 1, this threat is only exist in the attached and references management on 
TTP for center models. The analysis and countermeasures of this threat will be discussed below. 
3.4.1 Analysis  
The features extracted from the input signal or data capturing are replaced with a different, 
fraudulent feature set (assuming the representation method is known). Often the two stages of 
feature extraction and comparison component are inseparable and this mode of attack is 
extremely difficult. 
3.4.2 Countermeasures  
To overcome this threat, three facts have to be understood here:  
a. Biometric vendor algorithms have to be known in advance to apply such attack. Because 
the discriminating information in fingerprints is not tied to specific geometrical 
relationships, as it is in face-based systems (e.g., between eyes, nose, mouth, etc.). So, 
information cannot gather to form the original image.  
b. If the attacker injected preselected feature extracted image, encryption mechanism 
(example watermarking) needed to prevent this attack. 
c. Sequencing and timestamp will reduce this kind of attack.  
3.5 Threat 5 (T5): Threat to the comparison component  
According to table 1, this threat is shared by all biometric network models (local, download, 
attached, center, references management on TTP for local and references management on TTP 
for center). The analysis and countermeasures of this threat will be discussed below. 
3.5.1 Analysis  
The comparison component also called the matcher. The comparison component is attacked 
and corrupted so that it produces preselected match scores. When the comparison component 
compares the templates user retrieved from the storage component and the data captured of the 
users template retrieved from the data capturing component, the comparison component shows 
the score result on the device screen. This means, the attacker can attack the biometric device 
and change the match score to preselected ones.  
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3.5.2 Countermeasures  
The simplest way to stop attacks is to:  
a. Have the matcher reside at a secure location (client side).  
b. Match score encryption in the compassion component before transmission.  
c. Improve the matching accuracy to help decreasing this attack.  
d. Limit attempts prevent this attack effectively.  
e. Use (Alder, 2003) proposal of an algorithm to immune the template encryption. Any 
system which allows access to match scores effectively allows sample images to be 
regenerated in this way. This work implies that biometric templates and biometric match 
scores be considered identifiable data − they should not be made available to untrusted 
parties.  
Also considering the facts below: 
a. If the attacker will change the extracted feature values; she/he should know in advance 
how vendor algorithm works. 
b. Remapping the extracted feature is very complicated in finger print devices due to the 
fact that the information is not tied to specific geometrical relationships. 
c. Algorithm vendors keep their algorithms to be secret code.  
3.6 Threat 6 (T6): Threat to biometric storage component  
According to table 1, this threat is shared only by (local, download and center). The analysis 
and countermeasures of this threat will be discussed below.  
3.6.1 Analysis  
The storage component or the database of stored templates could be either local or remote. 
The data might be distributed over several servers. Here the attacker could try to modify one or 
more templates in the database, which could result either in authorizing a fraudulent individual 
or denying service to the persons associated with the corrupted template. A download model is 
implemented, the reference template from the server is sent to the client as the model design 
suggested. The download model uses one to one authentication process. Authentication process 
means that, the legitimate user enters her/his password into the finger print device, then, the 
finger print device will import the user's template from the server side "reference" based on the 
entered password. The Wire shark software is used to capture the data traveling in the UTP cable 
from the server to the client as Fig.4 shown. The captured data shows the image after the 
extracted feature applied. It is typically calculated using only a small portion of the original 
image. So these few hundred bytes in Fig.4 are much smaller than the original image. 
In Fig.4, (a) and (b) are the same finger “index finger” where (c) is different finger “middle 
finger”. Analyzing the data captured, observing that the data are the same in (a) and (b) despite 
of the time difference captured taken where (c) is different representation other than (a) and (b). 
This means, the users extracted feature is not time stamped, or the saved templates in the storage 
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component are not encrypted. For example, every time the legitimate user uses the finger print 
device for the same finger, the extracted feature representation is the same at all time. 
 
 
(a) Hex Representation of the data captured of the index finger (next to the thumb) at time 1 
 
(b) Hex Representation of the data captured of the index finger (next to the thumb) at time 2 
 
(c) Hex Representation of the data captured of the middle finger 
Fig.4. Data captured using Wire Shark 
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3.6.2 Countermeasures  
The simplest way to stop attacks is to: 1-Have the database resides at a secure location (client 
side). 2-Instead of storing the original biometric signal in the system database during enrollment, 
the system could store only its noninvertible transformed version. 
During recognition, the biometric sensor would transform the signal using the same 
noninvertible transform and perform matching in the transformed space. 
Different applications can use different noninvertible transforms (or different parameters of 
the same transform), so a template would be usable only by the application that created it. In fact, 
the user herself/himself could provide the transforms parameters in terms of a password or PIN. 
If an attacker ever compromises such a biometric template, the system can issue a new one using 
a different transform or different parameters. 3-A simple and effective method of creating an 
easily revocable biometric template is to encrypt the biometric template with the users password. 
4-An experiment example of finger print device data base is shown in Fig.5. The figure shows 
the template stored in the user account (in the server side) is non invertible (long binary data 
format) and template entry is not accessible.  
 
 
Fig.5. Snap shot of data base showing template of user with ID1 
3.7 Threat 7 (T7): Threat to the process of transferring biometric templates from the registration 
component to the storage component  
According to table 1, this threat is only exist in the download and comparison outsourcing by 
server models. The analysis and countermeasures of this threat will be discussed below. The 
details of this threat look like T4. 
3.7.1 Analysis  
The features extracted from the input signal are replaced with a different, fraudulent feature 
set (assuming the representation method is known). Often the two stages of feature extraction 
and the comparison component are inseparable and this mode of attack is extremely difficult. 
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The Wire shark software is used to capture the data traveling in the UTP cable from the client to 
the server as Fig.4 shown. The captured data shows the image after the extracted feature applied. 
It is typically calculated using only a small portion of the original image. So these few hundred 
bytes in Fig.4 are much smaller than the original image. 
3.7.2 Countermeasures  
To overcome this threat, three facts have to be understood here:  
1. Biometric vendor algorithms have to be known in advance to apply such attack. Because 
the discriminating information in fingerprints is not tied to specific geometrical 
relationships, as it is in face-based systems (e.g., between eyes, nose, mouth, etc). So, 
information cannot gather to form the original image. 
2. If the attacker injected preselected feature extracted image, encryption mechanism 
(example watermarking) needed to prevent this attack "As Fig.4 showed that the data 
captured are not encrypted.  
3. Sequencing and timestamp will reduce this kind of attack  
3.8 Threat 8 (T8): Threat to the process of transmitting the matching score from the comparison 
component  
According to table 1, all biometric network models have no such threat. Consequently, no 
analysis and countermeasures for this threat will be discussed.  
3.9 Threat 9 (T9): Threat to the registration component  
According to table 1, this threat is shared by all biometric network models (local, download, 
attached, center, comparison outsourcing by client and comparison outsourcing by server) except 
references management on TTP for local, references management on TTP for center and storage 
and comparison outsourcing models. The analysis and countermeasures of this threat will be 
discussed below.  
3.9.1 Analysis  
In recent biometric devices, registration component is the same as the signal processing 
component. So this threat is look like T3 except that the feature extracted is the first time to be 
extracted since this is the enrollment stage and to be sending to storage component. So, the 
registration component could be attacked using a Trojan horse, so that it produces feature sets 
preselected by the attacker.  
3.9.2 Countermeasures  
To reduce this threat, three facts have to be understood here:  
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a. If the attacker will change the extracted feature values, she/he should know in advance 
how vendor algorithm works.  
b. Remapping the extracted feature is very complicated in finger print devices due to the 
fact that the information is not tied to specific geometrical relationships.  
c. Algorithm vendors keep their algorithms to be secret code.  
Also practical solution is: the use of the buffer overflow. Any part of a trusted system that 
takes in information is generally buffering its received data. While the designer makes certain 
assumptions about the operation of a device, it may be possible to introduce data that would 
overflow the buffer. When the buffer overflow, the device is compromised and cannot be trusted.  
3.10 Threat 10 (T10): Threat to the decision component  
According to table 1, this threat is shared by all biometric network models (local, download, 
attached and center, references management on TTP for local and references management on 
TTP for center). The analysis and countermeasures of this threat will be discussed below.  
3.10.1 Analysis  
If the decision component can be overridden by an attacker, then authentication system has 
been disabled. Even if the actual pattern recognition framework has excellent performance 
characteristics, it has been rendered useless by the simple exercise of overriding the match result.  
3.10.2 Countermeasures  
The decision component needs to: Encrypt the decision before it is transmitted to the 
application. The biometric templates and biometric match scores are considered identifiable data 
they should not be made available to untrusted parties.  
3.11 Threat 11 (T11): Threat to the process of transmitting the stored biometric template to the 
comparison component  
According to table 1, this threat is only exist in the download and attached biometric models. 
The analysis and countermeasures of this threat will be discussed below. 
3.11.1 Analysis  
An attacker could attack the channel between the stored templates and the comparison. The 
stored templates are sent to the comparison through a communication channel. The data traveling 
through this channel could be intercepted and modified  
3.11.2 Countermeasures  
The simplest way to stop attacks is to:  
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a. Have the matcher and the database reside at a secure location (client side).  
b. Sequencing and timestamp will reduce this kind of attack.  
To overcome this threat, two facts have to be understood here: 
a. Biometric vendor algorithms have to be known in advance to apply such attack. Because 
the discriminating information in fingerprints is not tied to specific geometrical 
relationships, as it is in face-based systems (e.g., between eyes, nose, mouth, etc). So, 
information cannot gather to form the original image.  
b. If the attacker injected preselected feature extracted image, encryption mechanism 
(example watermarking) needed to prevent this attack "As Fig.4 showed that the data 
captured are not encrypted.  
3.12 Threat 12 (T12): Threat to the process of transmitting the decision result to an application 
system  
According to table 1, this threat is only exist in the local, download, references management 
on TTP for center and comparison outsourcing by server biometric models. The analysis and 
countermeasures of this threat will be discussed below.  
3.12.1 Analysis  
If the final match decision can be overridden by the attacker, then the authentication system 
has been disabled.  
3.12.2 Countermeasures  
The decision component needs to: Encrypt the decision before it is transmitted to the 
application. So, while the final answer is transmitting to the application it is encrypted and the 
application can only decrypt the decision and view it.  
3.13 Summary of countermeasures  
As the discussion and the analysis showed in the previous pages all of the twelve threats 
presented in the biometric technologies in open system networks and summarizing these 
solutions to be more effectively used in the future systems.  
By type, the solutions can be defined as follows:  
 S1: Solutions of mechanisms to be integrated with sensor (data capturing): temperature 
sensor, heart pulses measurement sensor and the use of challenge-response protocol.  
 S2: Solutions of using challenge response protocol, encoding technology.  
 S3: Solutions of knowing that remapping extracted feature is very complicated in finger 
print devices and the use of the buffer overflow.  
 S4: Solutions of using encryption mechanism (for ex, watermarking, sequence and 
timestamp).  
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 S5: Solutions of residing comparison component in secure location (for ex, client side). 
Increasing the threshold “matching accuracy” and matching score should be encrypted.  
 S6: Solutions of residing comparison component in secure location (for ex client side) 
and templates stored in data base should be in non-invertible format.  
 S7: Solutions of using encryption mechanism (for ex, watermarking, sequence and 
timestamp).  
 S8: No such threat.  
 S9: Solutions of knowing that remapping extracted feature is very complicated in finger 
print devices and the use of the buffer overflow.  
 S10: Solutions of encrypting the final decision.  
 S11: Solutions of residing comparison component in secure location (for ex, client side) 
and encryption mechanism (for ex, watermarking, sequence and timestamp needed).  
 S12: Solutions of encrypting the final decision in decision component before 
transmission in open system network.  
 
d. Conclusion and Future work  
The researchers’ findings are a compound of two related strategies. The First are a complete 
survey on eleven threats and their existing corresponding eleven solutions. The second part, 
which pertains to be threat 6 by proving the data, was not encrypted. The researchers have 
pointed out a number of specific solutions out of the solutions mentioned (section 3.13) which 
practically predicted to enrich future work, solutions are as follow:  
1. Heart pulses measurement sensor to be integrated with data capturing devices. 
2. The use of challenge response protocol to detect replay attack. 
3. Encryption technique needed to be implemented in the comparison component “matching 
score” and the final decision. 
4. The use of the hash technique for the templates resides in the database.  
Based on the previous study, a proposal of a secure biometric network model will be 
suggested. The suggested biometric network model will overcome all the vulnerabilities and 
security threats discussed earlier. Also, at the physical and electronic levels of the device itself, 
some of countermeasures should be considered to achieve the highest degree of security.  
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